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ippg IPPG Programme Office, IDPM, School of Environment & Development, University of Manchester, Harold Hankin Building, Precinct Centre, Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9PL Telephone 0161 306 6438 Fax 0161 273 8829 www.ippg.org.uk ippg Briefing paper no. Three July 2006 By STeve WigginS & Junior DaviS Assisted by comments from Adrian Leftwich & John Morton Economic institutions inTroDucTion Box a: DefiniTionS of economic Economic institutions have re-emerged at the centre of attention in development economics after inSTiTuTionS a long period when their existence and smooth ‘Essentially, institutions are durable systems functioning was assumed in the hypotheses of neo- of established and embedded social rules and classical economics. Recent analyses using cross- conventions that structure social interactions’ country regressions – see, for example, Rodrik, (Hodgson 2001 p.295) Subramanian & Trebbi 2002 – suggest that it is ‘A social institution is a regularity in social the quality of institutions that is the single most behaviour that is agreed to by all members of important difference between those economies in society, specifies behaviour in specific recurrent the developing world that have grown strongly and situations, and is either self-policed or policed by those that have not. some external authority.’ (Schotter 1981, quoted However, these insights have not necessarily in Langlois 1986 p.11) produced useful guides for policy-makers. It is one ‘Institutions are rules, enforcement thing to recognise the importance of institutional characteristics of rules, and norms of behaviour quality, but quite another to specify what makes that structure repeated human interaction.’ (North for quality and to suggest how it may be improved. 1989) As a first step towards understanding more about ‘Institutions are ‘repetitive patterns of institutions and their quality, three questions arise: interaction through which society undertakes how are economic institutions created, how do they certain functions.’ (King 1976) function, and with what effects? To begin to answer ‘Wide sense: persistent groups of norms of these questions, we need a working definition of behaviour which serve collectively valued purposes; economic institutions and an associated set of or in narrow sense of , a set of rules to facilitate concepts. co-ordination via allowing expectations to form.’ Defining inSTiTuTionS (Nabli & Nugent 1989) Definitions of institutions vary – see Box A; most would accept the idea that institutions comprise 1. The institutional context is largely missing from most norms, regulations and laws that establish the neo-classical models of market exchange and human interaction. ‘rules of the game’ – that is, that they condition In the neo-classical view, rules, social norms and preferences and modify the behaviour of individuals and groups are a given – thus understanding of economic institutions and so that their actions become more predictable human behaviour that does not conform to economic notions to others. They do so through both formal rules of the ‘rational individual’ is left to other disciplines such as that include laws and contracts and, as well as politics and sociology. Institutional economics may be seen to bring economics closer to other disciplines by arguing that through informal means such as social norms individuals make choices that are at least partly culturally and conventions that evolve over time. This use determined – thus moving beyond the longstanding focus of of ‘institution’ is quite different to that where it is economics on individual utility as the main guide to resource taken as synonymous with ‘organisation’. allocation. Paper prepared for the DFID-funded Research Programme, Institutions and Pro-Poor Growth (IPPG). The authors are grateful to DFID for the funding that made this research possible. The views expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author and in no way represent either the official policy of DFID or the policy of any other part of the UK Government. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior permission; for permission to reproduce this paper, or any part of thereof, please contact the editor at the address above. ippg ippg design. In the latter case, it may be government Box B: inSTiTuTionS anD policieS that establishes the institution, or it might be an All policy changes can be seen as changing the initiative from private enterprise or civil society. In rules of the game. If a tariff level is reduced from both cases, it can be argued that institutions are 20% to 10%, for example, the conditions – and created and evolve in response to the uncertainty, perhaps thus the ‘rules’ – governing imports have risk and information costs associated with living changed. Is this, then, an institutional change? and transacting in an imperfect world. Institutions And if so, are all economic policies effectively are thus rational mechanisms designed to cope institutions? with the imperfections of markets, including the Institutions are defined as helping form asymmetry of information held by different actors, stable expectations, hence institutions can only the problems that principals have in ensuring that be changed infrequently if they are to fulfil this their agents pursue the same goals, etc. This function. Institutions operate at a deeper level explains why seemingly ‘irrational’ and inefficient and are, in effect, constitutional; they establish institutions such as share-cropping have persisted the framework of rules within which more routine as ways to solve such imperfections. decisions take place. Whatever the origin of the institution, the more In the case of the import tariff, for example, widely it is recognised the better it will function and the institution is that which empowers the state such recognition reaches its maximum expression to set such tariffs. Thus, continuing the example, when the norm is endorsed by the state as legally a country that binds its tariffs in accordance with binding. Not all institutions require the support the rules of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) of governments, but some do in order to remove could be seen as changing an institution. This in ambiguity and to provide legal backing for the turn modifies the expectations of those engaged norms in question. Institutions may be seen as in international trade: the WTO norms set limits public goods in that their benefits (and costs) are to tariffs and discourage quantitative controls on shared by all in the economy, no matter who took 2 trade. the trouble to establish them. This suggests that many institutions will require action by governments Institutions can also be seen as constitutional, to create and implement the norm. they set the rules by which the game is played; it Most institutions are not lightly changed, even is this that distinguishes them from the wider set when clearly imperfect or outdated. Institutions are of economic policies – see Box B. valued for the predictability that they bring to the By narrowing the definition to economic system; frequent change and experimentation to institutions, those institutions that perform established norms is thus not usually encouraged. economic functions are covered; of these, three Moreover, particular institutions can confer rights sets can be identified: and advantages to particular groups in society • establishing and protecting property rights; who will use their power to prevent changes that • facilitating transactions; and, undermine their advantages. There is thus the • permitting economic co-operation and possibility of path dependency in that once certain organisation. institutions are in place, then other norms and Table 1 presents examples of the institutions behaviours ensue, thus reinforcing patterns of that perform these functions, together with the development and restricting the range of options agencies both formal and informal that regulate for policy. such functions. It will be noted that some of the Discussion of new institutions or changes to institutions that have economic functions may not institutions is often intense, parties recognise exist primarily for economic reasons – for example, the implications of creating new ‘rules’ for the councils of elders. game or of changing them and each will fight The definition of economic institutions can for their own interests. The political economy of be expanded and discussed by asking three key institutional change is therefore important in that questions about institutions, namely: they may evolve to confer privileges on particular • How are institutions, which affect economic groups, whether or not the institutions are efficient growth and its distribution established, sustained and effective for society as a whole, and once in and changed? place may be difficult to change. An additional • What determines their effective consideration is that those administrating the functioning? How is this related to the social, rules may also resist change simply owing to the cultural and political matrix from which they arise thereof. and in which they operate? How much do they hoW Do economic inSTiTuTionS funcTion? depend upon formal endorsement by the state? An important point is that the functioning of an • How do institutional interactions influence institution is not necessarily to be inferred from its economic growth, the pattern of growth and, specifically, the possibilities for pro-poor growth? hoW are economic inSTiTuTionS formeD? 2. Not all institutions, of course, necessarily confer benefits on all in society. Far from it. For example, formal limitations Institutions emerge in two ways: either informally on the property rights or rights to carry out certain sorts of through repeated interactions between individuals business, that may apply to specific ethnic groups, or women or organisations that establish expected norms – not to mention institutions such as slavery – are all real- of behaviour; or else formally through deliberate world examples of institutions that confer benefits for some, but impose high costs on others. 2 3 ippg ippg TaBle 1: a claSSificaTion of economic inSTiTuTionS funcTion exampleS Typical formal informal regulaTing regulaTing agency agency Property rights Land tenure Land registries Oral history, chiefs & Establish rights; decide other local political between competing claims; authorities inform non-owners & police Inheritance law Probate registry Custom Intellectual property Patent offices rights: patents, copyright Reciprocracy: Weights, measures, Standards bureaux facilitating transactions standards Establish rules of exchange, Contract law; dispute Civil courts; Elders, religious respect for contracts arbitration arbitration councils courts Provide information Public information on Market information Reduce or re-allocate risk markets agencies Physical provision Local authorities; Customary points & organisation stock exchanges/ for exchange of markets (e.g. bourses (crossroads, etc.) auction rings, stock Market hierarchies exchanges, futures (Market mammies/ markets) queens/etc.) Banking conventions, Bank regulatory Haveli systems instruments (letters agencies of credit, etc.) Auditing & accounting Professional conventions associations Insurance companies Professional associations Co-operation & Laws on limited Register of companies Organisation: liability & bankruptcy Allow Competition policy Commissions on • Interactions within monopolies & organisations mergers • Collective action & co- operation (in labour, price Regulations on co- Co-operatives Social norms of co- negotiation) operatives, charities, ministries, bureaux operation • Realising economies civil associations of scale and managing Auditing & accounting Professional diseconomies of scale conventions associations Employment Min labour, Custom regulations employment tribunals form. For example, very similar institutions exist hoW Do inSTiTuTionS affecT economic in many countries that govern the collection of bad groWTh anD poverTy reDucTion? debts, but how long it may take to recover such The functioning of institutions potentially affects debts can vary greatly, depending on the details of three factors that help determine economic growth, administrative requirements and the efficacy of the 3 legal system. Similarly, there are often significant thus: differences in the extent to which property owners • Investment: when property rights are feel secure in their rights, even when the form secure, owners of capital are more likely to of entitlement may be the same. The study of invest, all other things being equal. If it is easy institutions thus requires detailed investigation of to trade, obtain credit, retain a reasonable share actual functioning, rather than merely recording of the profits (that is, without excessive taxation) the apparent form. and to insure against risks, investment is again Functioning may be determined by deeper encouraged. Investment may also be stimulated underlying norms in society on matters such as the when establishing companies or more informal extent of generalised trust, and individual freedom economic groups, (and the organization of their versus obligations to wider collectives. More generally, then, institutions are often embedded in 3. There is a fourth factor, widely recognised in the social and cultural characteristics of the particular literature – human capital. It is not obvious that economic context. institutions affect this directly – although it might be argued htat when economic institutions function well, and economic growth accelerates, there is greater incentive for governments and individuals to invest in human capital. 2 3 ippg functioning) is relatively straightforward. • Technical innovation: again, secure intellectual property rights are likely to promote private investment in research and development of innovations. • Economic organisation: is likely to be more effective and efficient, delivering the benefits of specialisation and economies of scale where they apply, when institutions facilitate transactions and co-operation between individuals, whether in formal companies or less formal co-operatives. It is easy to imagine that there will be reinforcing interactions between the factors. For example, economies that generate technical innovations readily and where economic organization is efficient are likely to be seen as having a good business environment and consequently likely to attract investment, thus it may well be that sets of institutions function in synergy to generate growth. Institutions are also likely to have a profound influence on the pattern of economic growth and the distribution of rewards within economies and societies – and thereby affect levels of poverty. Property rights will clearly be important, since they assign entitlements to factors of production and may also affect the bargaining power of different groups in society. More subtle are the ways in which institutions governing transactions and economic co-operation allow those without immediate access to factors of production to obtain credit, rent land, trade and to form small companies or co-operatives, and thereby earn their livelihoods. referenceS Langlois, Richard N., 1986, ‘The New Institutional Economics: an introductory essay’, in Richard N. Langlois (Ed.), Economics as a process: essays in the New Institutional Economics. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. North, D C., 1989, ‘Institutions and economic growth: an historical introduction’, World Development, 17 (9), 1319–32. Nabli, M. K. & J. B. Nugent, 1989, ‘The New Institutional Economics and its applicability to development’, World Development, 17 (9), 1333– 1347. Rodrik, Dani, Arvind Subramanian & Francesco Trebbi, 2002, ‘Institutions rule: the primacy of institutions over integration and geography in economic development’, IMF Working Paper, WP/02/189. Washington DC, International Monetary Fund. Hodgson, Geoffrey M., 2001, How economics forgot history. London, Routledge. King, Roger, 1976, Farmers co-operatives in northern Nigeria, PhD thesis. Reading, University of Reading. 4
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